-2-seligman (1981) warned that the heterogeneity of interest rate assumptions was the source of a potentially serious problem in measuring the key variable in their study of the effect of unfunded pension liabilities on share prices.1
The new data make it possible to assess the importance of this source of bias and to examine whether the market takes the differences in interest rate assumptions into account in evaluating pension liabilities.
To understand the link between national saving and the effect of pension obligations on share prices, it is useful to consider the effect of a firm that obtains lower present wages in exchange for a promise of future pension benefits with the same present value but does not fund the resu)ting pension obligation. As a result, the firm reports higher earnings and adds the earnings to its capital stock. Over time, the firm's capital stock is increased by an amount equal to its unfunded pension obligation. If shareholders correctly perceive the unfunded obligation, they will recognize that the change in the form of employee compensation has not made the shareholders any wealthier and their consumption will remain unchanged. The net effect of the pension on national saving will therefore be the difference between the firm's additional retained earnings and the reduction in the employees' direct personal saving that is induced by the promise of retirement benefits.2 If, however, the share price understates the unfunded pension obligation, shareholders will regard themselves as wealthier, increase their consumption, and thus reduce national saving by a 1The same problem also affects the share prices studies of Gersovitz (1980) and Oldfield (1977) as well as any other study that uses the reported values of pension liabilities.. 21fl the extreme case in which employees reduce direct personal saving by a dollar for every dollar of present value of promised pension benefits, the introduction of the pension would have no effect on total saving. The effect of unfunded pension obligations has attracted attention not only because a significant fraction of the pension obligations of some firms are now unfunded but also because alternative legal funding requirements could increase the extent to which pension obligations are not explicitly funded.
Current ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) and tax rules require companies to fund their pension obligations over a period of years and permit a deduction in the calculation of taxable income only for the amount contributedto a fund. An alternative rule would be a "book reserving" system in which a firm would not be obliged to fund its pension obligation but could deduct for tax purposes the present value of a pension obligation that it assumes even if it does not fund that obligation as long as it reports the obligation on its "books" (i.e., balance sheet) and finds an appropriate organization like an insurance company or bank to "guarantee" that pension obligation. The national savings impact of unfunded pensions of this type would depend on the ability of share prices to reflect the accumulating liability and therefore to prevent shareholders from increasing their consumption in response to the apparent but artificial increase in the net assets of the firm.
In considering a firm's pension obligations, it is important to distinguish vested benefits from other types of expected pension payments. The vested benefits are those that will be paid to existing retirees and that would have to be paid to current employees even if they left the firm immediately. In addition to these vested benefits, there are also two other types of benefits that a firm or its shareholders might take into account. First, "unvested 11n the special case referred to in the previous footnote, the provision of a private pension could actually reduce national saving.
accrued pension benefits" refer to the benefits that current employees have earned on the basis of their service with the firm but which have n4t yet become vested. Second, firms also look ahead and, on the basis of expected employee turnover and projected wages, estimate the pension benefits that current employees are likely to receive when they retire. Firms may use this very broad concept of benefits based on past and future employment for the purpose of determining the tax-deductible contributions that they can make to their pension fund. Pension assets can therefore exceed both vested pension liabilities and total past service liabilities.
Focusing on the vested pension benefits is important for two reasons.
First, vested benefits are the only legal obligation of the firm and have been the principal concern of financial analysts who discuss pension obligations.
Moreover, as Bulow (1979 Bulow ( , 1981 has explained, the cost to the firm of any nonvested pension benefits can in principle be offset by corresponding reductions in wage payments as those benefits become vested. However, as Feldatein and Seligman note, it is not clear to what extent such wage adjustments are actually made in practice or taken into account by financial analysts. It is noteworthy, though, that while firms are required to report values for vested benefit obligations and sometimes report values for other past service liabilities, the broader measure of total expected liabilities is not reported.
Most of the estimates presented in this paper refer to the difference between vested pension liabilities and pension assets. The "unfunded vested pension liability" (uvPL) reported by the firms in our sample is in fact negative for more than two-thirds of the firms in our basic sample (92 of 132 firms reported negative UIIPL), implying that their pension fund assets exceed their vested liabilities. Moreover, the aggregate value of pension assets of the firm in our sample exceed the aggregate value of vested pension liabilities. Some analyses using the broader measure of total unfunded accrued pension liabilities (UAPr) will also be reported. For this variable, 62 percent of the firms in our basic sample reported a negative value.1
Those firms with negative unfunded liabilities have accumulated more in pension assets than the present value of the pension benefits that they have promised to their employees. If these benefit promises establish an upper limitS on the extent to which the pensions depress private saving,2 the "superfunded"
pensions are potential net contributors to national saving. The extent to which superfunded pensions do increase national saving depends on the response of shareholders. To the extent that share prices ignore the value of these excess reserves, the extra corporate pension fund accumulations will not be offset by reduced shareholder saving.
Our analysis will generally treat underfunded and superfunded pension liabilities symmetrically by using a single variable to represent the net liability of firms. In section 4 we will however examine this symmetry assumption explicitly.
The first section of the paper discusses the data that we use and the basic specification of the corporate valuation equations that are estimated 1When the pension liabilities are reevaluated using the market interest rate in$tead of the lower values assumed by the companies in their calculations, significantly higher fractions of the companies had assets that exceeded their liabilities. Using the Baa bond rate prevailing at the end of the sample year suggests that virtually all firms in the sample had pension assets in excess of both vested and part service liabilities.
need not be true if employees reduce their own saving to offset the benefits that they anticipate on the basis of their expected future employment experience and not just the benefits rights that they have already accumulated.
-6-in this paper. In section 2 we present the basic estimates of the effect on firms' market values of the net unfunded pension liabilities that the firms report. The third section then discusses the importance of the alternative interest rate assumptions used in calculating the present value of liabilities and presents alternative estimates based on the use of a common interest rate for all firms.
The analysis in sections 2 and 3 estimate linear relations between the market value of the firm and the net unfunded pension liabilities. Section 4 considers two generalizations of this basic specification: separate effects of pension assets and of liabilities, and different effects of positive and negative unfunded liabilities.
The fifth section provides some evidence on why firms choose different interest rate assumptions for valuing pension liabilities and, more generally, why firms have different unfunded pension liabilities.
There is a brief concluding section that summarizes the fundings, comments on the implication for national saving, and indicates some possible directions for future research.
The Specification and Data
The framework for our analysis is a valuation model that relates the market value of the firm per dollar of its physical capital to several basic determinants of market value including the firm's unfunded pension liability.
The basic specification is thué the same as that used in Feldatein and Seligman (1981) and therefore builds on earlier studies of market valuation by Gordon (1962) , Modigliani and Miller (1958) , Oldfield (1977) , Tobin and Brainard (1977) and others.
-7-Under certain strict conditions, the market value (v) of a firm's equity and debt will be equal to the replacement value of its underlying physical assets (A). More generally, however, the marginal and average values of physical assets will not be the same1 and even the marginal value of an additional amount of physical capital will differ from one if there are distortionary taxes2 or if the firm's capital stock is not in equilibrium.
Differences among firms in the observed valuation ratio, q = V/A , will reflect perceived differences in the firms' abilities to provide above-average earnings and in the riskiness of their earnings and asset value.
The potential earning ability of a firm depends on such things as market position, patents, know-how, etc. The specification used in the present study represents future earnings by three variables: (1) the current ratio of earnings to physical assets, E/A , where E includes interest payments as well as equity profits;3 (2) the growth of earnings over the past decade,4 GROW; and (3) expenditure on research and developnent as a fraction of the value of the firm's physical assets (RD/A) 1Hayashi (1981) shows the conditions under which the marginal and average value of capital which are equal. 2Auerbach (1979), Feldstein and Green (1980) and King (1977) discuss the effect of taxes on the market value of marginal additions to the capital stock.
would in principle be desirable to, adjust E by adding to it the difference between the firm's pension contribution and the increase in vested benefits during the year. Such an adjustment would be unlikely to have a substantial effect since completely omitting E or GROW or both does not change the implied effect of UVPL/A. 4mis variable is defined in the same way as it was in Feldstein and Seligman: the difference between average earnings in the most recent five years and average earnings in the previous five years divided by the 1979 value of physical assets in the final years of this ten year period.
The capital asset pricing model implies that the risk of investment in a firm's equity should be measured by the beta coefficient measure of the sensitivity of the firm's share price to the value of the total market portfolio.
The beta value for a firm depends on how broadly the "total market portfolio" is defined (equities Only; all financial assets; all investment assets including land, gold, etc.) and on the frequency of the observations used for calculatin€ the beta coefficient (daily, monthly, annual, etc.) . The present study employs the widely available beta values based on monthly observations and an equity market portfolio that is calculated by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith.
A second measure of risk included in the current study is the ratio of the net debt1 to total capital, DEBT/A . A higher debt ratio increases the risk of bankruptcy and limits the firm's ability to undertake potentially profitable investment activities.
Since unfunded vested pension liabilities are a form of corporate debt,3 they should in principle be included with other debt in measuring the market value of the firm (v) and in calculating the net DEBT variable. If the pension liability of the firm were accurately measured,4 the unfunded vested liability could be added directly to the market value of conventional debt or, 1Net debt is defined as total financial liabilities minus financial assets. Short term assets and liabilities are included at book value but long term liabilities are revalued by assuming that they have a remaining maturity of ten years and pay a nine percent coupon rate but are valued to have the 1979 year-end yield to maturity of about 12 percent. For many firms in our sample net debt is actually negative; financial assets including cash and accounts receivable exceed financial liabilities.
2See Gordon and Nalkiel (1979) and Myers (1977) .
31f the unfunded liability is negattve, it actually represents a financial asset or "negative debt." 4See section one of Feldstein and Seligman (1981) for a discussion of the problems of pension liability measurement and the inadequacies of the reported estimates. Note in particular that unfunded liabilities are tax deductible when funded or paid. Similarly, until liabilities are paid, the relevant interest rate is a net of tax rate. The sign of c* (the coefficient of the debt variable) is uncertain.
In a strict Modigliani-Miller world, c would be zero. More generally, the increased risks of bankruptcy and the adverse effect of debt on investment opportunities would imply that is negative. However, if the tax factors discussed by Auerbach (1979) and King (1977) make the value of V/A less than one for equity while the value of V/A for debt is equal to one, firms with higher ratios of debt to physical assets will have higher values of V/A and may be positive.
As we noted in the introduction, our analysis will examine both the unfunded vested pension obligations and the broader measure of the total unfunded accrued liabilities (UAPL/A). ftBETA+ DEBT UVPL where AE is the "equity value" of the physical assets (i.e., the replacement value of the physical assets minus the value of the net debt and of the preferred shares), EE is the equity earnings of the firm, and GROWE Is the tenyear growth of equity earnings. For this purpose, EE is defined as profits after tax plus the equity owners' real gain or loss on net financial assets (i.e., the product of the inflation rate and the firm's net financial debt).
Our analysis is based on data for a sample of large manufacturing firms for 1979. As a further check on our results, we also present estimates only for those firms that used LIFO as the primary method of inventory evaluation.
We are aware of the difficulty of making valid inferences about the effect of unfunded pension liabilities on the basis of equations like 1 and 2.
Any omitted variables will bias the estimated coefficient. If, for example, large unfunded vested liabilities are characteristic of financially weak cornpanies, the estimates of and would reflect this weakness and be biased away from -1. Moreover, firms can to some extent influence the size of their reported liabilities by the interest rate assumption that they choose.
A finding that the coefficient of the pension liability variable is substantially different from -1 must therefore be treated with substantial caution since the difference may reflect statistical bias rather than a failure of the financial market to appraise the extent of a firm's pension obligations.
In contrast, a finding that the pension liability, variable has a coefficient of approximately -1 would be reassuring support for the view that the financial market correctly assesses pension liabilities since finding the appropriate answer by chance alone, although possible, would be very unlikely.
Effects of Unfunded Pension Liabilities
This section presents the basic estimates of the effects on the value Before discussing the coefficient of the pension variable, it is useful to comment on the coefficients of the other variables.
An increase in the firm's capital income (i.e., the debt and equity have raised the equity value of the firms with greater net debt (Summers, 1982) . One purpose of the inflation adjustment is to correct the understatement of production costs for firms that do not use the last-in-first-out (LIFO) method of inventory accounting. By 1979, the inflation adjustment had become extremely important; for all nonfinancial corporations as a whole, the inflation adjustment was more than 60 percent of real after tax profits. As a further check, we therefore estimated the basic equation for the subset of 85 firms that used LIFO as the primary method of inventory accounting. The results, presented in equations 1.3 and 1.4, are essentially the same as for the entire sample.
Although our emphasis is on the estimates using inflation adjusted data for earnings and assets, we recognize that the financial community continues to rely primarily on conventional accounting data. We have therefore reestimated the basic equations using the conventional accounting figures; the results are shown in equations 1.5 and 1.6.2 The estimates of the unfunded pen1There are so many problems of measurement that we are reluctant to give a stronger. interpretation. Nevertheless, while coefficients not significantly different from -1 could occur by chance in the current and previous study, we regard that as unlikely.
2The mean of the dependent variable is 1.30, substantially higher than the inflation-adjusted value.
siori liability variables are essentially unchanged; they are slightly larger than with the inflation-adjusted data but the difference is less than one standard error. Earnings, earnings-growth and debt appear to have a larger effect on the value of the corporation and the level of research and development spending has a smaller effect. The unfunded accrued liabilities continue to have slightly greater explanatory power than the unfunded vested liabilities.
The second set of six equations in Table 1 When the conventional accounting data are used without adjustment for inflation (equation 1.11 and 1.12), the coefficients of the unfunded pension liability variables are reduced substantially to approximately -0.7 and are about equal in size to their standard errors. On the basis of these two coefficients alone, one could not reject the hypothesis that the true parameter is either zero or minus one. Although we regard the instability of the coefficients estimated with conventional accounting data as evidence against relying on such data without inflation adjustment, we recognize that these estimates can also be 1The dependent variable is VE/AE where VE is the market value of the firm's stock and AE is the difference between the value of property, plant, equipment and inventories and the firm's net debt. The mean of this variable is 0.82 when the data are inflation adjusted and 1.54 when they are not inflation adjusted.
-17-interpreted as raising some doubt about the conclusion that the coefficient of the pension variable is significantly negative. We shall therefore continue to present estimates in the later sections of' the paper based on the conventional accounting data as well as on the data which has been adjusted for inflation.
Alternative Interest Rate Assumptions
It has been customary for pension actuaries to assume a low rate of interest in calculating the present value of pension liabilities. Thus the average interest rate assumed by the 132 firms in our sample was only 7.3 percent, far less than the 12.1 percent rate on Baa bonds that prevailed at the end of 1979 or the 10.7 percent average Baa rate for the year 1979 as a whole.1
Using a low discount rate increases the present value of vested pension benefits and therefore of the unfunded pension liability.
In considering the effect of the interest rate assumption, it is important to distinguish between vested pension liabilities and the total future pension benefits thata firm expects to pay to its current employees and on the basis of which it may legally determine its funding contributions. In estimating the total future pension benefits, the firm must project the employees' future wage growth (as well as the probabilities of death and of employment separation.) The typical pension benefit formula relates an individual's retirement benefits to his wage during a year or a few year's immediately before
Despite the tax advantage of investing pension funds exclusively in debt instruments ('Black, 1980 , Tepper, 1980 , most pensions invest in both debt and equity and, considering the greater risk of equity as a method of funding nominal liabilities, expect to earn an even higher nominal return on equity. It might, however, be argued that the appropriate rate for discounting future liabilities is a risk-free rate, with any extra return going to shareholders as compensation for assuming the portfolio risk while guaranteeing the benefits. But even a 10 year U.S. Treasury bond had a 1979 year-end yield of 10.4 percent.
-18-retirement. The present value at any time in an employee's career of the benefits that he will be paid during his first year of retirement depends on the difference between the discount rate and the projected rate of growth of wages.
Since pension actuaries have generally assumed a low rate of wage growth, the use of a low discount rate may not produce as substantial a bias in their estimates of total future pension liabilities as it might at first appear. The value of benefits to be paid after retirement, however, depends only on the discount rate, implying that the present value of total future pension benefits is typically overstated.
Vested pension benefits depend only on an employee's previous 0 experience with the firm. Although that experience will entitle the employee to greater future benefits if he stays with the firm,1 the future annual value of his benefit is fixed if he leaves the firm immediately. Thus, in calculating the present value of vested benefits, the likely future growth of wages is irrelevant. The assumptions of an artificially low interest rate unambiguoi.sly raises the value of vested pension liabilities.2 The same upward bias occurs in the calculations of the present value of unvested benefits based on past service and therefore on the total accrued pension liability.
typical defined benefit pension plan makes retirement benefits proportional to the product of the final years (or years') earnings and the number of years of employment with the firm.
2The low interest rate assumption is advantageous to the firm because it permits the firm to make greater tax-deductible pension contributions. We return to this in section 5.
The 132 companies in our sample assumed interest rates that ranged from 5 percent to 10.5 percent. For all but 13 companies, the rate was between 6 percent and 9 percent. The assumed interest rates thus differ significantJ,y from each other and from the actual rate of return available on pension fund assets. Since the firms reported pension assets and vested liabilities that are approximately equal in value,1 a chan,e in the interest rate could have a significant effect on the estimate of unfunded liabilities and therefore potentially on the estimated regression coefficient of this variable in the market value equation.
The effect on the present value of vested pension benefits of changes in the interest rate assumption depends on the current distribution of vested benefits among employees and retirees of different ages. ¶Lb1e 2 shows the actuarial present value of a dollar a year from age 65 until death evaluated at ages between L5 and 70 for three different interest rates.2 The closer an employee is to retirement, the nearer in time are his benefits and the less sensitive is their present value to the interest rate assumption. For example, 1The mean absolute value of unfunded vested pension liabilities as a percentae of pension assets was only 6.56 percent; for total accrued pension liabilities, the corresponding figure was 1.02 percent.
2The actuarial present value was calculated usin the 1978 age specific death rates for white males that are presented in the l930 Statistical Abstract of the United States.
-20- Unfortunately, data are not available for each firm on the distribution of vested pension benefits by employee and retiree age. Although the actual distribution will differ among firms, it is clear that most ofthe "weight" of the typical vested pension distribution is among retirees and older employees in the years just before retirement. This concentration reflects three things. First and most important, the benefits of retirees and older workers are closer in time and therefore subject to less mortality risk and less interest rate discounting. Table 2 shows that the present actuarial value of a given benefit is reduced to half or less between ages 65 and 55. Noreover, the actuarial present value of a one dollar annual benefit at age 70 is worth more -21-than the prospect at age 60 of a one dollar benefit from age 65. Second, older workers and retirees have generally accumulated more years of service with a firm and vested benefits are generally proportional to the number of years of service after an initial period. Finally, older workers generally have higher earnings and vested benefits are also proportional to earnings.1 Bulow (1979) reports that professional actuaries often assume as a rule of thumb that the age distribution of vested benefits is such that the overall present value of vested benefits is inversely proportional to the rate of interest. It is clear from firm used an interest rate even remotely as high as this, it seems unlikely that the financial market implicitly used such a high rate in evaluating the unfunded pension liabilities. This is confirmed by the estimates presented below that show using such a high discount rate reduces the explanatory power of the market valuation equation and causes the coefficient of the pension liability variables to be small and insignificant.
The second adjustment standardizes all pension liabilities to a discount rate of 7.2 percent, the average rate used by the 132 firms in the sample. This has the effect of eliminating the relative overstatements and understatements of pension liabilities that result from the variety of interest rate assumptions while changing very little the estimated liability for firms that use a rate close to the average for the group. It is equivalent to assuming that financial markets adjust the stated pension liabilities for deviations from common practice rather than for deviations from a Baa rate. Table 3 summarizes the effect of different interest rate assumptions on the estimated impact of pension liabilities on the market value of the firm.
The estimates are based on the specifications presented in Table 1 and therefore in equations 1 and 2 of section 1. For each equation, Table 3 Changing the specification from the total market value of the firm to the market value of equity also has virtually no effect on the estimated coefficients of the unfunded pension liability variables. The specification with the lowest sum of squared residuals again corresponds to the unfunded accrued liability evaluated with the common average rate of return.
When the conventional accounting data are used without inflation adjustment, the estimated coefficients are less stable. For the total market value of the firm, the evidence indicates that the best specification uses the actual interest rate and unfunded accrued liabilities. The coefficient of the pension liability variable is -1.59 with a standard error of 0.48. The Baa rate has a substantially higher residual sum of squares. With the common average interest rate, the coefficient is -0.05 with a standard error of 0.23.
Finally, for the market value of the corporate equity, the best specification corresponds to the common average interest rate. The coefficient of the unfunded vested pension liability is -0.85 with a standard error of 0.20 and therefore quite similar to the estimate with the inflation adjusted variables.
Because the unfunded pension liabilities evaluated at a common average interest rate generally have a better explanatory power than the corresponding reported pension liabilities, we have reestimated the specifications of table 1 with these more appropriately measured pension variables. The results are presented in Table 4 . The coefficients of the pension variables estimated for our entire sample of firms have already been discussed in conjunction with Although we have included five variables that can influence the market value of the firm, it is of course still possible that the unfunded pension liability is correlated with some other omitted variable and that the apparent effort of the unfunded pension liability is really only a reflection of this omitted variable. In particular, it might be argued that "strong" companies fully fund or overfund their accumulated liabilities while "weaker" companies have large unfunded liabilities. To the extent that this is true and that corporate strength and weakness are not reflected in the other variables, the negative coefficient of the unfunded liability will reflect the corporation's generally weak financial position. Although it is clearly impossible to rule out completely such an "omitted variable" argument, we have tried to test for the importance of such an effect by reestimating the inflation adjusted equations of Table 4 with the company's bond rating as an additional variable.
The bond rating represents an expert judgment about the long-term financial Total Market rating for the longest maturity bond issued in 1979 and scale this rating from a 9 for an Aaa rated bond to 4 for a B rated bond.
For the equations determining the total market value of debt and equity, the coefficient of this variable as small (0.04) 
Additional Specification
The estimates presented in the previous sections assume that there is a linear relation between the market value of the firm and its unfunded vested pension liabilities. This specification implies that a one dollar increase in the firm's pension liability has the same effect on the firm's value as a one dollar decrease in the value of the firm's pension assets. The linear specification also implies that the market responds in the same way to unfunded liabilities that are positive as it does to unfunded liabilities that are negative.
The present section presents estimates that relax these constraints.
1Jererny Bulow has told us that he has investigated the relation between unfunded pension liabilities and the rate of return on equity over the previous decade (as a measure of the "quality" of the firm) but found no relation. 
Separating Assets and Liabilities
The equations in Table 5 mon average discount rate, the implied coefficient of pension liabilities is -0.91 (with a standard error of 0.29) while the implIed coefficient of pension assets is 0.55 with a standard error of 0.36. The difference between these two coefficients is inarina1ly significant; the corresponding t-statistic is 1.8 and therefore significant at the 7 percent level.
Taken at face value, the coefficients in Table 5 generally imply that each dollar increase in a firm's pension liabilities reduces the firm's market value by about one dollar while each dollar increase in pension assets increases in value by less that a dollar. If this is correct, it provides at least a 1Recall that a uinii can accumulate pension assets only to the extent that it can satisfy the Internal Revenue Service that these assets are a reasonable provision against future pension liabilities. Note also that this explanation assumes that the value of such liabilities will not be offset by lower wages in the future.
2Stuart Myers has pointed out to us that, when separate coefficients are estimated for pension assets and liabilities, it is not possible to distinguish among different assumed constant discount rates. The superiority of a common rate over varying individual assumptions remains.
short-run reason for firms not to fully fund or overfund their pensions. It also implies that to the extent that firms make pension promises that reduce the savings of employees, the market perceives the extra liability and therefore has the information to adjust other personal saving. At the same time, the lower coefficient of the pension assets variable implies that the market does not accurately reflect the extent of asset accumulation in the pension fund.
The net effect of this is that an increase in a funded vested liability reduces the market value of the firm and induces additional saving.
Positive and Negative Net Liabilities
A different but related issue is raised by the fact that pension assets exceed liabilities for the majority of the firms in our sample. Does the market respond differently to "unfunded" pension liabilities that are positive and to the unfunded liabilities that are negative and therefore represent an additional net asset of the firm? To answer this question, we have divided each unfunded pension liability variable into two variables, e.g., PUVPL/A is UVPL/A if this is a positive amount (implying that liabilities exceed assets) and NUVPL/A if IJVPL/A is a negative amount (implying that assets exceed liabilities.) Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients of the positive and, negative pension liability variables. These coefficients are based on the same basic specification used in Tables 1 and 4 . The pension liabilities are adjusted to a common average discount rate and all of the data are adjusted for in flat ion.
All four parameter estimates show a much larger negative coefficient for the firms with actual unfunded liabilities (the "positive" liability coefficients) than for the firms in which assets exceed liabilities. In Table 6 Effects It is, however, also possible that the observed difference between the "positive" and "negative" coefficients are more than statistical artifact and do reflect the way that the financial market responds differently to these two -35-types of firms. Since a firm that fails to fund fully its vested or past service liability incurs a higher corporate tax than would otherwise be necessary, a firm's failure to fund these liabilities may be an indication to the financial market that the firm is in a financially weak position or is not well managed.
This could account for coefficients of the unfunded liability variables that are absolutely greater than one. This argument would, however, suggest a symmetrically favorable effect on a firm's market value if its pension liabilities are substantially overfunded and therefore an equally large negative coefficient for firms with negative unfunded liabilities. One reason why this is not observed is that, as we noted earlier in this section, the financial market may regard large pension assets as an indication that the firm has correspondingly large future pension benefits that are not yet vested or based on past service but that can he reasonably anticipated for the future. We can think of no way to test this two part explanation.
Why Firms Choose Different Interest Assumptions
As we noted in section 3, the choice of the discount rate has a very powerful effect on the value of vested and other accrued pension liabilities.
Since these benefits are based only on employees' past service, future wage rates and turnover rates are irrelevant. As a rough approximation, the value of unfunded pension liabilities varies in inverse proportion to the assumed interest rate.
The tax law provides a strong reason for companies to assume a low interest rate. By increasing the value of its pension liability, the firm can justify accumulating more pension assets. For any given stream of anticipated benefits, the accumulation of more pension assets is equivalent to reducing the -36-real cost of those pensions. The reduced cost reflects the fact that the earnings in the pension fund are untaxed while earnings on assets held by the corporation are taxed and the interest rate that the corporation pays on its own debt is deductible from taxable income.
If the tax benefits of early funding were the only influence on the choice of an interest rate assumption, firms would choose the lowest permissible interest rate. But a low interest rate assumption also has it disadvantages.
Firms may wish to avoid making the large annual funding payments that would result from a low interest assumption and may not wish to report that they have large unfunded pensions liabilities. To the extent that this is true, they will prefer a higher interest assumption. A large unfunded liability requires a firm to increase the annual contribution to its pension fund. This directly reduces the firms reported earnings. Firms may fear that this in turn will have an adverse effect on the market price of the firms' stock because portfolio investors do not correctly perceive the reason for the lower reported earnings. Moreover, a firm that has limited access to credit or that faces a rising marginal cost of funds may prefer to postpone funding. To the extent that a firm can fund as much as it wants at a moderate or high interest rate, it will have no incentive to use a lower interest rate.
A large unfunded liability may also he regarded by corporate management as undesirable in itself. It wold not be unreasonable for them to fear that such a liability would depress the equity value of the firm and increase its cost of debt. If financial investors are unable to take the firm's choice of interest rate into account in interpreting its reputed liability, the firm may be able to raise its value by selecting a high interest rate that causes -37-Firms that have large vested pension liabilites when calculated at some standard rate will have more incentive to reduce their apparent liability by selecting a high interest rate. Even more likely, firms that have large unfunded liabilities (when valued at a standard interest rate) will have an incentive to choose a high interest rate and virtually nothing to gain by choosing a low rate. Conversely, firms in which pension assets exceed liability (when valued at a standard rate) will have no reason to disguise the size of their promised liability and every reason to increase the size of that'liability in order to increase the rate of tax-deductible funding.
The evidence that we have examined indicates that firms do systematically choose their interest rate assumption in the way that this analysis suggests. Table 7 presents estimates of the way in which the choice of interest rate is influenced by the firm's pension liability (adjusted to the common average discount rate to permit comparability) and by other variables that measure the firm's financial condition. Equation 7.1 shows that firms with large vested pension liabilities tend to choose high interest rate assumptions. The assumed interest rate is related even more strongly to the firm's unfunded vested pension liability, a fact shown in equation 7.2. Firms with higher ratios of net debt to assets may be more reluctant to increase the size of their pension fund and therefore may prefer a higher assumed interest rate. The coefficient of DEBT/A in equation 3 is positive but just barely larger than its standard error.
Equations 7.4 and 7.5 indicate that the choice of the interest rate assumption can also be explained by reference to the total accrued pension liabilities although that variable has somewhat weaker explanatory power than -39-the vested liability.
Equations 7.6 and 7.7 indicate that firms with better bond ratings choose higher interest rates.1 Again the coefficient of this variable is only slightly larger than its standard error and may be due to chance. If it is not due to chance, the positive relation between bond rating and the choice of interest assumptions suggests that the causation is actually from the interest rate assumption to the bond rating. Thus, a firm with a given "true" value of UVPL/A that chooses a high interest rate assumption will appear to have a smaller pension liability. This in turn makes the firm appear financially sound if the rating agency does not take its interest rate assumption into account.
The last three equations are based on data that have not been adjusted for inflation. Those results are quite similar to the corresponding equations with inflation adjusted data.
It is clear from the estimates presented in Table 7 that firms do engage in strategic attempts to reduce their reported unfunded vested pension liabilities when the benefits from doing so may outweigh the tax advantages of early funding.
Conclusion
The purpose of the current study has been to assess the extent to which. the market value of firms reflects accurately their unfunded pension obligations. Although there are substantial problems in measuring pension liabilities and in specifying an appropriate framework for estimating their effect on 1Recall that the bond rating variable scores Moody's Aaa bonds as 9 and decreases the score linearly with lower bond ratings. market values, the results presented in this paper can be said to be generally consistent with the view that the market value of firms reflects a conventional measure of unfunded pension obligations or net pension assets.
The value of vested pension liabilities depends critically on the interest rate that firms use to discount future benefit oblications. The 132 large manufacturing firms in the sample used a wide range of interest rates from 5.0 percent to 10.5 percent in evaluating their 1979 pension liabilities. The choice of interest rate appears to reflect the deliberate policy of firms with substantial benefit obligations relative to existing pension assets to try to reduce the reputed present value of their obligation. Similarly, firms in which pension assets are large relative to benefit obligations tend to choose low interest rate assumptions in order to increase the tax advantages of early funding.
The financial market appears to "see through" this manipulation of pension liabilities and sets market values that are related more closely to a pension obligation evaluated at a common standard interest rate than to the pension obligations as reported by the finns. Although an appropriate interest rate for evaluating pension obligations would be the long-term interest rate prevailing in 1979, our evidence indicates that market values of firms are related much more closely to pension liabilities evaluated at the average rate used by all of the firms in our sample (7.2 percent) than to the pension liabilities implied by the Baa rate (1 2.1 percent).
The majority of firms in the sample have pension assets that exceed the value of pension liabilities. There is some evidence in our estimates that the market gives more weight to pension liabilities than to pension assets and responds more to variations in the excess of liabilities over assets than to the excess of assets over liabilities. Although we offer son tentative explanations of these asymmetries, we are aware that they might also be an indication of a misspecification of the basic equations.
More research with additional data could help to resolve, some of the remaining problems. Using cross-section data on a panel of firms for several years would permit eliminating firm specific effects that may bias the estimated effect of the pension liabilities. With data for several years, it might also be possible to modify the measurement of earnings to include information on pension contributions and the changes in vested pension liabilities. It would certainty be very useful to obtain data on the age distribution of vested benefit obligations in order to improve the adjustment of total vested obligations to a common rate of interest.
If the two basic findings of this study --that the market appears to see through the "pension veil" and that the market value of the firm reflects pension obligations evaluated at an interest rate that is far below the market rate --are correct, they have important implications for the relation of pensions to national saving. First, pension liabilities are evaluated at an interest rate that is too low, the present value of those liabilities is overstated. Thus share prices are depressed by larger pension obligations and shareholders have an increased incentive to save. Second, if pension assets are correctly perceived by the financial market, the extent of pension funding will not influence aggregate priva,te saving. Moreover, to the extent that the evidence of section I implies that the market gives too little value to pension assets, an increase in pension assets will not reduce other private saving by an -42-offsetting amount. The overstatement of pension liabilities and the possible understatement of pension assets thus suggests that the expanding size of the private pension system may increase total saving by companies and their share holders.1 1Any conclusion about the overall effect of pensions on saving depends also on the response of employees to promised pension benefits. It is of course possible that employees may substitute promised pension benefits for direct saving. If the interest rate that they would anticipate on their own direct saving is less than the interest rate earned by the pension fund, total saving could decline. Alternatively, the higher potential yield on pension saving might induce employees to increase planned retirement consumption by enough to raise the level of current saving despite the higher interest rate. The problem is closely related to the discussion in Feldstein (1978b) .
